Recently, in discussions around the country and in the blogosphere, I see and hear extensive criticism and 2nd guessing of how the sad and despicable affairs of the BDR incident were handled. A principal refrain seems to be that the army should have been rushed in to shoot their way to a glorious rescue. Are we serious?
All you armchair generals, can you cite ONE instance of a situation in known history where an armed force of thousands had taken over a barricaded area with a large trapped civilian population in a dense urban setting and another armed force attacked immediately (within two to three hours) and successfully rescued the hostages and/or disarmed the 'rebels'? Let me make it easier, can you cite an example of armed hostage taking of even a few (ten to twenty) by a smaller, heavily armed force (sub-machine guns, mortars and grenades) in a dense urban setting where an assault team has immediately and successfully stormed the premises? By successful storming, I mean with no or minimal unintended deaths or collateral damage.
Here are some examples: On October 23, 2002, approximately 30-40 heavily armed Chechens took about 800-900 people hostage in a Moscow theater. The highly trained and fully equipped Russian security apparatus negotiated and waited four days before pumping in poison gas and storming the theater and killing/executing a reported 39 of the Chechens. Even then somewhere between 129 and 200 civilians died – all but one as a result of the "rescue" operation. A special forces operative was reported as saying that had they not used the poison gas, there could have been more than 150 casualties amongst the rescuers. There are many other examples: On September 1, 2004 in Beslan, North Ossetia-Alania, a group of armed Chechens took over a school, holding over 1,000 hostages. Three days later, Russian security forces stormed the building with tanks and heavy weapons. The resulting carnage caused almost 350 hostage deaths and hundreds more wounded or
missing. On February 28, 1993, agents from United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) attempted to execute a search warrant at the Branch Davidian ranch in Waco, Texas. The resulting siege situation lasted 51 days. When FBI agents ultimately moved in, the "rescue" caused 76 deaths. In 1972, the attempt by German police to rescue Israeli athletes taken hostage by the terrorist group, Black September, resulted in the death of 11 hostages (source: Various Wikipedia articles).
The moral is not that you do not ever attack terrorists and hostage takers but that you do it with a cool head, after all other means of recourse have failed and that it almost always results in massive casualties. According to a "hostage negotiation study guide" developed with the help of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the first rule is "ICER" isolate, contain, evaluate and report. Note that "assault" is not on the menu for first responders! For over thirty years, the New York City Police Department has used a process concerning terrorist incidents that they characterize as "time, talk, and tear gas."
The reality is that the world's most highly trained forces could not have secured Peelkhana by force without massive loss of innocent lives ranging from innocent BDR personnel and their families who may have been coerced or were swept up in the mutiny, to the very hostages that they were going to save. Even the army officers who remained alive (and if you assume there had been about 150 officers present and about 60 are dead or missing, that implies 90 of them were in there, alive) were wearing BDR uniforms (as is customary) and they had taken off their rank markings — they too would very possibly have been killed in a rushed, ill-conceived attack. The ringleaders and outside agents, if they had done their planning (as seems likely) could very well have escaped and in the middle of the hundreds, if not thousands of victims, truth would have been the first casualty. As it is, few seem to want to wait for the truth to emerge before pointing at their
favorite scapegoats. No one can ever say for certain what could have happened from the path not taken. But there is plenty of evidence that hot-headed assaults are minimally effective and cause maximum anguish.
There is NO gamebook, except perhaps in the lands of the likes of Idi Amin and such despots, where massive armed conflict is precipitated in a dense urban civilian zone in the midst of the fog of lack of information and disinformation. The other reality is that our security forces have very little preparation for this type of event (note I do not say "army" I say security forces). How do you use anti-aircraft guns to flush out "rebels" hiding amidst "innocents" in residential quarters and office buildings? What happened when the lights were out? In classic hostage rescue, it is usually the rescuers who try and turn the power off so that they can have the advantage of night vision equipment over the hostage takers who are usually less prepared. The power being off was a golden opportunity for elite, trained units (again I don't say army - but "trained units") to go in and assess the situation and come back with reports and/or a plan of
action. The reality is that while we have many brave men, we have no such well equipped, elite, trained units. So all we seem to be doing is crying about the darkness, instead of wondering why we didn't take advantage of a situation when advantage normally reverts to those who have better plans, equipment and capabilities. Whoever had the responsibility of securing the perimeter (if there was such a person or entity), did not even seem to know exactly how the perimeter worked. Reportedly, they were guarding the principal gates and left much of the perimeter wall around Gate 5, including, perhaps Gate 5, unsecured. Did someone order that Gate 5 and the surrounds be left unguarded – or did they just forget about it? Whose job was it? It is not the prime minister or even the home minister's job to secure an area. The buck may stop there but they only recently got that charter. The responsibility for controlling the security forces and maintaining
discipline and command and of staying informed about their morale lies with the command structure and this was a massive command failure. It was likely also a cynical and brutal attempt by as yet unknown parties to start a civil war and precipitate the fall of the government.
I commend the civilian government as well as the military high command for handling a terrible situation about as well as they could have – perhaps even, brilliantly!
Moreover, the prime minister showed excellent responsiveness in going in front of the officers and I do not blame the officers for being emotional - they are Bengalis!
All in all, I give the civilian government an "A" for their handling of the crisis and the army an "A" for its restraint. The intelligence agencies, however, all of them - police, RAB, DGFI, etc. all get an "F". And as for those trying to make hay out of this sad moment by undue finger pointing and 2nd guessing (certain political leaders come to mind), I give an "U" for unsatisfactory conduct.
So, enough already!
Let the investigations proceed and let the nation try to heal its wounds!
Let the investigations be thorough, just and transparent.
Let the institutions that govern and guard the country show their true strength by being fair and open and by being accountable to the people they serve.
Justice must be sure – not just sure as in inevitable, but also sure as in certain.
The past is the past and will always color our thoughts and actions - but think of the future and what ought to be done NOW - not what could have been done. If you have to indulge in "I wish they had done …" fantasy, then consider "I wish they had a better feel for the pulse of the BDR jawans … so that matters could have been headed off long before things came to a head".
But it would be better if instead, you pray for the souls of the departed and for the safety and security of Bangladesh and its people and thank God that a larger calamity was avoided.
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