http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_05/lookingback.asp
LOOKING BACK: The 1998 Indian and Pakistani Nuclear
Tests
Michael Krepon
Ten years ago, the governments of India and Pakistan
tested nuclear devices, prompting a global uproar, a
united front by the five permanent members (P-5) of
the UN Security Council, and stiff sanctions directed
at New Delhi and Islamabad. Although the timing of the
tests came as a surprise to the U.S. intelligence
community, New Delhi had foreshadowed its decision to
test two years earlier by withdrawing from the
negotiating endgame for the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), a goal that was ardently championed
from 1954 onward by Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first
prime minister, and his successors.
New Delhi's stated reason for its reversal was the
failure by states possessing nuclear weapons to accept
a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament along
with the CTBT. New Delhi also took issue with a
complex entry-into-force (EIF) provision that would
make the treaty contingent on India's deposit of its
instrument of ratification, along with no less than 43
other states that then possessed nuclear power or
research reactors.[1] This provision, which was widely
perceived at home as an affront to India's strategic
autonomy, bore the fingerprints of China, France,
Russia, and the United Kingdom, which wished to
prolong taking the treaty's bitter medicine as long as
possible by forcing others to take it as well.
The real reasons behind the Indian government's sudden
reversal on the CTBT were not the EIF clause, despite
its aggravating features, nor the absence of a
time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament, an
agenda item that was not part of the negotiations.
What truly rankled New Delhi was that the walls of the
global nonproliferation system appeared to be closing
in from all sides. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) had been indefinitely extended in 1995, with the
promise of a CTBT to follow—a promise that the P-5
could condition but from which they could not back
away. India's nuclear enclave believed that
negotiations on a treaty ending the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons would be next in
line. Global export controls also seemed to be closing
in on India's nuclear options, while the
screw-tighteners seemed to put blinders on when China
helped Pakistan.
No nuclear agreement has more onerous EIF provisions
than the CTBT, which attests to the reluctance of the
P-5 to accept what President Bill Clinton called "the
longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in arms control
history." By comparison, the Chemical Weapons
Convention required the deposit of 65 instruments of
ratification, and the NPT simply required the deposit
of instruments of ratification by the United Kingdom,
United States, and USSR, along with 40 other
countries. Securing comparable EIF procedures for the
CTBT and avoiding the treaty's extended limbo would
have required Clinton's strenuous, early, and
sustained efforts. Instead, Clinton put off
consideration of EIF provisions until the very end of
negotiations, when he succeeded in convincing British
Prime Minister John Major to be more flexible. Then,
instead of making other phone calls, Clinton quickly
threw in the towel.[2] The hour was late, and the time
had come, in the view of the president and his
advisers, to orchestrate a treaty signing ceremony at
the United Nations.
The P-5 signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996, thereby
incurring the obligation under international law not
to undercut the treaty's objectives and purposes
pending its entry into force or until renunciation of
their treaty commitments. Two of the five, China and
the United States, have yet to deposit their
instruments of ratification. The Senate refused to
consent to ratification in 1999—a sad tale recounted
below—and China's legislature continues to consider
this matter at a snail-like pace.
Even if Washington and Beijing were to join the 144
other capitals that have ratified the CTBT, other
prominent holdouts may not follow suit. Despite the
international community's best efforts, India and
Pakistan refused to sign the treaty after testing
nuclear devices. This reluctance either reflects
lingering domestic constraints against doing so, the
intention to test again after a suitable interval, or
both. Other holdouts, which include Egypt, Iran, and
Israel, as well as North Korea, which broke a global
moratorium on nuclear testing that had lasted for
eight and a half years after the Indian and Pakistani
tests, may be expected to seek inducements and
conditions that the EIF procedures invite. Rarely in
the history of nuclear negotiations has a provision
ostensibly designed to rope in stragglers given them
so much bargaining leverage or mischief-making
potential.
The CTBT and the Indian and Pakistani Tests
Many Indian supporters of the CTBT argued that it
would help reduce the shadow cast by nuclear weapons
over international politics, thereby advancing India's
long-standing goal of nuclear abolition. This and
other arguments fell on deaf ears. India's test of a
nuclear device in 1974 was more of a physics
experiment than a workable bomb design, and India's
nuclear enclave was chafing at the bit. If ever there
was a juncture to break free of New Delhi's
decades-long ambivalence regarding nuclear weapons, it
was, paradoxically, at a time of progress to prevent
proliferation and to end nuclear testing permanently.
The timing of India's decision to test depended on the
election of a coalition government led by a party with
enough nerve to break out of this box. That government
took office in March 1998, led by the Bharatiya Janata
Party's (BJP) two most senior politicians, Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Deputy Prime
Minister L.K. Advani. When India finally decided to
test, it was almost a foregone conclusion that
Pakistan would follow suit.
Predictably, instead of tying New Delhi's hands, the
EIF clause became a source of indignation across the
domestic political spectrum, a powerful
consensus-builder to reject any constraints on India's
nuclear options sought by outside powers. As
anticipated, the Pakistani government welcomed the
disapprobation placed on India for withdrawing support
for the CTBT and waited in the shadows for New Delhi's
eventual decision to accept even more heat by testing
nuclear devices. When New Delhi obliged on May 11 and
13, no inducements or penalties the United States and
other capitals could identify were powerful enough to
prevent Pakistan from following suit. Just to make
sure that Pakistan would reject U.S. offers and to
prevent India from being singled out for international
pressure, Advani issued a thinly veiled public threat
to the effect that now that New Delhi possessed the
bomb, its neighbor should watch its step in
Kashmir.[3] Pakistan tested its nuclear devices on May
28. The exact number of tests conducted on the
subcontinent in May 1998 remains in doubt because
several devices were tested simultaneously and because
Pakistan may have inflated its number of tests for
political reasons.
After the Tests
Immediately after New Delhi inaugurated this round of
testing, the Clinton administration made an intense
effort to threaten international isolation unless the
governments of India and Pakistan signed the CTBT and
took other steps to reduce nuclear dangers. The point
man for the Clinton administration was Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. His opposite number
was Jaswant Singh, a confidant of Vajpayee who was
later appointed external affairs minister in December
1998. Talbott quickly came to the conclusion that
little would result from his dialogue with Pakistan
unless he could first gain traction in India.
Drawing from a P-5 joint communiqué issued in June
1998, Talbott and his negotiating team initially laid
down five conditions for India and Pakistan to meet in
order to be freed of sanctions and to break their
diplomatic isolation. The topmost condition was
signing the CTBT. Next was cooperation in negotiating
a permanent ban on the production of fissile material
and, pending this negotiation, a freeze on further
production of bomb-making material. Third, the United
States wanted both countries to accept a "strategic
restraint regime" that would limit ballistic missile
inventories to versions that had already been tested.
Other parts of the strategic restraint regime included
pledges by India and Pakistan not to deploy missiles
close to each other's borders and also not to maintain
warheads atop missiles or stored nearby. Fourth, the
United States demanded that both countries adopt
"world class" export controls. The fifth condition
called on India and Pakistan to "resume dialogue to
address the root causes of tension between them,
including Kashmir."[4]
Beijing's imprint on the P-5's conditions was
difficult to miss, as the proposed strategic restraint
regime and a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT)
would not just curtail New Delhi's options against
Pakistan, but would also significantly constrain India
from countering China's strategic modernization
programs. The reference to Kashmir as the "root cause
of tensions" on the subcontinent, without mentioning
Pakistan's support for crossings of the Kashmir divide
by Islamic extremists to initiate acts of violence,
was akin to waving a red flag in front of a very
disgruntled Brahma bull. Nonetheless, India swallowed
its resentments over the P-5's agenda. New Delhi's top
priority after May 1998 was to chip away at its
diplomatic isolation, and the best interlocutor to
accomplish this objective was the United States.
The talks began in June 1998. Singh asserts in his
memoirs that, at the outset, he told Talbott, "I was
not there to negotiate, either to give or to ask for
anything. I was really there much more to engage in a
dialogue.... [W]e could endeavor to harmonize our
views so that the first requirement—a restoration of
confidence—is achieved, even if only in part."[5] This
was a deft gambit, one that Talbott could hardly
refuse. U.S.-Indian bilateral relations were in
desperate need of repair, and the upside potential of
a serious dialogue could yield important dividends
downstream. Neither could Talbott wave away the
Clinton administration's stipulations for concrete
measures to reduce nuclear dangers, specially the need
for India to sign the CTBT.
The extended dialogue between Talbott and Singh might
be likened to the diplomatic equivalent of a handicap
match in professional wrestling, with the world's sole
superpower shouldering the handicap. The most crucial
factor in the Talbott-Singh strategic dialogue was the
passage of time because the Clinton administration had
less than three years to accomplish any of its
objectives. As Talbott wrote, "India's strategy was to
play for the day when the United States would get over
its huffing and puffing, and with a sign of exhaustion
or a shrug of resignation, accept a nuclear-armed
India as a fully responsible and fully entitled member
of the international community."[6] For a nation such
as India, which waited 24 years between tests of
nuclear devices, three years was not a very long time
to outwait Washington.
The primary reason why New Delhi backed away from
previous internal deliberations to test was the threat
of economic sanctions imposed by foreign governments
on an overly centralized, underperforming national
economy. According to a well-sourced Indian account,
an internal assessment done prior to the 1998 tests
estimated that if sanctions lasted more than six
months, the Indian economy could be seriously
stressed.[7] Members of the U.S. Congress from farming
states began chipping away at the sanctions well
before then, in search of export earnings. Commercial
interests in Paris and Moscow also began to erode the
P-5's united front, as might be expected. One by one,
the concrete measures demanded of India by the Clinton
administration slipped off the negotiating table.
What remained was the CTBT. Vajpayee announced a
moratorium on testing in May 1998, even before Talbott
and Singh met, but this was hardly the legal or
political equivalent of signing the CTBT. The U.S.
negotiating team repeatedly asked a simple question:
If New Delhi had no plans or intentions to test again,
why not sign the CTBT? Talbott, a meticulous
chronicler of nuclear negotiations, never got a
straightforward answer. He recalls Singh stating in
June 1998 that, "in exchange for the lifting of
American sanctions, India might take the next step,
'de jure formalization of our position and acceptance
of the letter of the treaty.'"[8] In August 1998,
Singh showed Talbott a letter from Vajpayee to Clinton
promising "to engage constructively with a view to
arriving at a decision regarding adherence to the CTBT
by the month of September 1999."[9] During this visit
to Washington, Talbott reports that, in his presence,
Singh told national security adviser Sandy Berger that
"Vajpayee had made an 'irreversible' decision to sign
the CTBT—it was just a question of how and when to
make that decision public."[10] In January 1999,
Talbott reports that Singh told him that "India would
sign the CTBT by the end of May."[11] None of these
statements were vocalized publicly by Indian
officials.
Singh's memoir offers no promises in this regard. He
writes, "India had a certain position on the CTBT, and
we were going to move purposefully in that
direction—but at our own pace. The Prime Minister had
already stated that we were not going to conduct more
tests. This was a self-imposed restraint amounting to
a moratorium." Singh stresses in his account and in
his meetings with U.S. officials that the CTBT had
been "demonized" in India and that it was widely
viewed as "an unequal, dangerous, and coercive
treaty."[12] In perhaps the most revealing passage
about his interactions with Talbott, Singh notes in
characteristically stilted fashion that "[i]f,
occasionally during the dialogue and in discussing the
issue of adhering to the CTBT, recourse was taken to
deflective ambiguity, that can hardly be characterized
as adherence."[13]
The longer the U.S.-Indian strategic dialogue
proceeded, the less Singh needed to resort to
deflective ambiguity. The Clinton administration
necessarily needed to turn its attention elsewhere,
especially to al Qaeda, which had begun to carry out
long-distance acts of violence from its base in
Afghanistan. The flurry of nuclear tests also set in
motion dangerous friction between India and Pakistan
that raised nuclear dangers and the risk of
uncontrolled escalation. Within eight months after
testing nuclear devices, General Pervez Musharraf,
Pakistan's chief of army staff, in effect called
Advani's bluff over Kashmir by beginning to infiltrate
military units across the Kashmir divide in
mountainous terrain overlooking the town of Kargil.
Infiltration levels and acts of violence carried out
by Pakistani-supported jihadi groups on Indian soil
were also becoming more brazen. The
stability/instability paradox—a construct devised by
Western deterrence theorists who postulated that
nuclear weapons could check full-scale wars but
encourage mischief-making below the nuclear
threshold—seemed to be playing out on the subcontinent
under a risk-taking Pakistani army chief.[14]
Beginning in May 1999, when the Pakistani units were
discovered by Indian reconnaissance teams in the
heights overlooking Kargil, the CTBT took a distant
back seat to the need to secure a Pakistani withdrawal
and to prevent the high-altitude war from expanding in
scope and intensity. Several unanticipated
consequences and deep ironies resulted from U.S.
crisis management in the Kargil war. Clinton, who was
withholding a trip to the subcontinent as leverage for
CTBT signatures, promised one to Pakistani Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif as a face saver for withdrawal.
His subsequent trip to the region clarified how much
progress was possible in improving Indo-U.S. relations
and how badly strained bilateral ties with Pakistan
had become, primarily due to its ties to al Qaeda and
other Islamic extremist groups.
The prospects of gaining Indian and Pakistani
signatures on the CTBT were hanging by a slender
thread when the Republican-led Senate suddenly
consented to long-standing demands by their Democratic
colleagues to vote on the treaty. The Clinton White
House and Senate Democratic leadership were completely
unprepared for this eventuality and ignorant of the
prior efforts by Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) to line up
sufficient Republican votes to kill the treaty.
Relations between Republicans and the Clinton White
House were venomous, as reflected in the 16-month-long
impeachment proceedings during 1998-1999 regarding
Clinton's sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky. Lines
of communication were also severed between Democrats
and Republicans on Capitol Hill. When Senator Byron
Dorgan (D-N.D.) stood up in the Senate in September
1999 expressing his intention to block all further
proceedings unless the CTBT were brought up for a
vote, he was about to learn that Kyl had the votes to
defeat ratification.[15]
Senate Democrats found it awkward to pivot away from
the CTBT after demanding a vote. As in Geneva, the
Senate's negotiating endgame left the Clinton White
House holding a very poor hand. Clinton had neither
the time nor the leverage to influence the outcome.
Sixty-two Senators, led by John Warner (R-Va.) and
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), tried to avoid a
complete train wreck over the CTBT by signing a letter
requesting postponement of the vote. Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
agreed to withdraw the treaty if Clinton would request
a withdrawal in writing and if he would pledge not to
bring up the CTBT for the duration of his presidency.
Under the prevailing circumstances, these conditions
bowed to political realities, but the second condition
was somehow deemed unacceptable by the Clinton White
House. As Berger explained, "The president believes
that it is inappropriate for him to say to the world
that the United States is out of the nonproliferation
business during an election year."[16] On October 13,
1999, the Senate failed to give the CTBT a simple
majority, let alone the necessary two-thirds vote
required for passage. The vote was 48 in support, 51
opposed.
September 11 and U.S. Relations With India and
Pakistan
The Bush administration's agenda for the subcontinent
shifted dramatically after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, as it sought to forge a strategic
partnership with Islamabad to fight the "war on
terror" and to create a new partnership with India
with the unstated purpose of helping to provide a
counterweight to China. On September 22, 2001, the
Bush administration lifted all remaining economic
sanctions on India and Pakistan, except for sanctions
on entities that had engaged in proliferation-related
commerce. India's economic potential, trade, and
growth have inoculated the country from new threats of
sanctions. Besides, the Bush administration made it a
strategic priority to befriend India, including the
promotion of a wide-ranging civil nuclear cooperation
agreement with New Delhi, overriding decades of export
control arrangements established by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. The Bush administration asked for
very little in return, least of all India's signature
on the CTBT. Ironically, this proposed deal, which was
the Bush administration's most important regional
priority as Pakistani governance faltered, remains in
limbo. Like the CTBT, the deal has been stymied by
polarized domestic politics in India.
Ten years after testing nuclear devices, India and
Pakistan still have not accepted any constraints on
their strategic autonomy. Along with China, both
states are engaged in strategic modernization programs
of considerable breadth, building nuclear-tipped
cruise missiles as well as ballistic missiles to be
carried by their land, sea, and air forces.[17] India
has plans for a deterrent it deems worthy of a major
power, which might entail further tests to certify
thermonuclear weapon designs. If India tests again,
Pakistan is likely to do so as well. The nuclear
enclaves in each county are highly respected at home
and believe they have more work to do. This spells
trouble not only for the CTBT's entry into force, but
also for initiating and successfully concluding
fissile material cutoff negotiations in Geneva.
Looking back, the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan
and the subsequent rejection by the Senate of the CTBT
were significant setbacks for global nonproliferation
efforts. Nonetheless, the sky has not fallen. In the
following decade, only one additional device has been
tested, the lowest number in any 10-year period since
the bomb's unveiling. This test, by North Korea, was
widely condemned and helped to spur diplomatic efforts
to dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear infrastructure.
Although other nuclear-weapon enclaves would welcome
the opportunity to test again, several are weaker than
they have ever been, and political leaders are
hesitant to be the first to break an informal global
moratorium or to follow the lead of an outlier state.
This calculus of restraint can change quickly,
especially if China, Russia, or the United States is
the first to resume testing.
Looking forward, U.S. CTBT ratification depends, in
the first instance, on the identity of the next
president. Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) voted against
the CTBT in 1999; Senators Barack Obama (D-Ill.) and
Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) support the treaty. Yet, even
if the next president thinks positively of the CTBT,
he or she will have many pressing matters to address.
The priority attached to the CTBT will depend in part
on the projected vote count in the Senate. Perhaps a
dozen Republican senators will need to join Democrats
in consenting to ratification, including some, such as
Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), who voted nay in 1999.
Kyl may well hold an even more important Republican
leadership position after the next U.S. election, and
his opposition appears unyielding. If the new
administration is favorably disposed toward the CTBT
and if its vote count falls short, moving forward
might well require trade-offs involving support for
some variant of the Reliable Replacement Warhead
program that may be very controversial and
unacceptable to long-standing treaty supporters who
oppose new warhead assembly lines.
Another option for the next U.S. administration would
be to pursue modest but useful steps that are already
in train, thanks to the steady and wise leadership of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization's
(CTBTO) current executive secretary, Tibor Tóth of
Hungary, and his predecessor, Wolfgang Hoffmann of
Germany. The treaty's international monitoring system
is being expanded, and valuable training exercises are
being carried out. The next administration may also
see the wisdom of paying U.S. dues to the CTBTO in
full. The treaty's international monitoring network's
ability to identify the sub-kiloton North Korean
nuclear test marks a major success story. Adapting and
adding to this network to provide for an improved
tsunami early-warning system could add to the success
of the CTBTO.
We are a long way from closure regarding the CTBT.
India, like the United States, believes deeply that it
is an exceptional country and exceptional countries
prefer to lead rather than to join. The harsh
treatment meted out to the civil nuclear cooperation
agreement by opposition leaders in the BJP—an
agreement they would surely have welcomed had they
been in power during the Bush administration—does not
bode well for forging a national consensus in India on
the CTBT. The EIF provision continues to serve its
intended, malign purpose, which in turn makes it
essential to continue an informal global moratorium on
testing.
Ten years after the May 1998 tests, India and Pakistan
remain outliers to treaties that help define
responsible stewardship of nuclear arsenals. Pakistan
shows every inclination to compete with India, as is
suggested by its growing bomb-making infrastructure
and its willingness to block the initiation of
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva. Islamabad's
response to treaty commitments remains fixed: Pakistan
will consider whatever India agrees to first.
Meanwhile, New Delhi's timelines for considering the
CTBT and the cutoff treaty seem quite elastic.
The positive news about nuclear stabilization measures
on the subcontinent lies outside the domain of
treaties. India and Pakistan have agreed to several
confidence-building and nuclear risk-reduction
measures, such as notifications regarding certain
missile flight tests and military exercises. After a
period of domestic turbulence in Pakistan, these
discussions will resume, perhaps yielding more
agreements that reduce the possibility of unintended
escalation. Each country is focused on trade, economic
development, and domestic cohesion. In turn, this
requires that the divided territory of Kashmir, which
Pakistani officials used to describe as a "nuclear
flashpoint," remain on the back burner. These
important gains are unlikely to be supplemented by
constructive initiatives relating to nuclear
negotiations.
Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Henry L.
Stimson Center and a diplomat scholar at the
University of Virginia. His next book, Better Safe
than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb, will
be published by Stanford University Press.
ENDNOTES
1. See Arundhati Ghose, Statement to the Conference on
Disarmament, Geneva, June 20, 1996.
2. Senior Clinton administration officials, interviews
with author, Washington, D.C., 1996.
3. "Islamabad should realise the change in the
geo-strategic situation in the region and the world.
It must roll back its anti-India policy especially
with regard to Kashmir. Any other course will be
futile and costly for Pakistan." Sabina Inderjit,
"Advani Tells Pakistan to Roll Back Its Anti-India
Policy," Times of India, May 19, 1998 (quoting
Advani).
4. See Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy,
Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington: Brookings
Institution Press, 2004), pp. 96-97. Talbott's account
is essential for specialists and accessible to
nonexperts, making it an excellent teaching tool for
the complexities of proliferation and U.S.-Indian
relations.
5. Jaswant Singh, In Service of Emergent India: A Call
to Honor (Calcutta: Rupa & Co., 2006; Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2007), p. 253.
6. Talbott, Engaging India, p. 5.
7. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, The Secret Story
of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi:
HarperCollins, 2000), pp. 48-49.
8. Talbott, Engaging India, p. 86.
9. Ibid., p. 121.
10. Ibid., p. 123.
11. Ibid., p. 145.
12. Singh, In Service of Emergent India, p. 263.
13. Ibid., p. 274.
14. For more on the stability/instability paradox as
it applies to South Asia, see Michael Krepon, "The
Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and
Escalation Control in South Asia," in Prospects for
Peace in South Asia, ed. Rafiq Dossani and Henry S.
Rowen (Stanford University Press, 2005); Michael
Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider, eds.,
Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South
Asia (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center,
2004). For another perspective, see S. Paul Kapur,
"India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear
South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe," International
Security, No. 30 (Fall 2005), pp. 127-152.
15. For a superb case study, see Terry L. Deibel,
"Inside the Water's Edge: The Senate Votes on the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Institute for the
Study of Diplomacy Case Studies, No. 263 (2003).
16. Ibid., p. 147.
17. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen,
"India's Nuclear Forces, 2007," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, No. 63 (July/August 2007), pp. 74-78;
Robert S. Norris, "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2007,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, No. 63 (May/June
2007), pp. 71-74.
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