BDR, Indo-Bangla Border and the Barbed Wire Fence (BWF) By Dr. K.. M. A. Malik The wholesale murder of the Army Commanders of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) by a group of traitors and conspirators (with an unidentified commando force from outside) has exposed the country's extreme vulnerability to internal and external sabotage. It has also brought the nation's internal and border security to a near collapse (for the time being at least), to the advantage of its secret and declared enemies. Although the true nature of the conspiracy is yet to be established, it is already clear that ˜The Peelkhana Massacre has increased the threat to Bangladesh's territorial integrity from two hostile forces – the Border Securityy Forces from India and Myanmar. India has been alleging for a long time that millions of ‘illegal migrants and terrorist infiltrators from Bangladesh are causing serious problems for its economy and stability. Another serious allegation is that ISI and DGFI work together on Bangladesh soil to train and arm the rebels from India's North East. In order to prevent the alleged ‘cross border illegal migration and infiltration, India has nearly completed a ‘Barbed Wire Fence (BWF) along its border with Bangladesh. This fence has tremendous implications for the reputation of Bangladesh and its border security. I wrote an essay on this issue in January 2006, which was published in the Weekly Bangla Mirror (London) in four parts (on January 20, 2006, January 27, 2006, February 3, 2006 and February 10, 2006). Since the topic is related to BDR and Bangladesh’s border security, it is reproduced here for wider awareness and discussion among those who believe in a truly sovereign Bangladesh. Although the essay is more than two years old, in my opinion it is still relevant today, especially since what we have been witnessing since February 26, 2009 - a deep rooted conspiracy to demolish any credible border security forces to uphold Bangladesh’s prestige and national interests. More detailed and up-to-date information and expert analyses regarding the BDR and the BSF stationed along the Indo-Bangla border and why India has always been highly aggressive towards BDR and Bangladeshi citizens are available in the articles: Indo-Bangladesh Border’ by Abu Rushd, ‘BSF Aggression in Border Areas: License to kill?’ by Major (Retd) Ashrafuzzaman, Major (Retd) Khalil Bin Wahid and Major (Red) M. A. J. Wadud Didar, and Border Smuggling and a piece of our tragedy by Major (Red) M. A. J. Wadud Didar, all published in the September 2008 Issue of Bangladesh Defence Journal. While the controversial ˜security wallâ constructed by Israel in the occupied West Bank has been much opposed by international community, little attention has been paid to the ‘security wall’ constructed by India along its land borders with Bangladesh. Although this issue that has been a thorn in the flesh of Indo-Bangladesh relations for nearly six years, particularly in many border skirmishes between the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), there have been hardly any meaningful discussions and debates in the media and public forums. India plans to build impregnable barbed wire fences or a security wall along the whole length of the land border with Bangladesh. In fact, about 1,300 miles of the fence has already been constructed during the last six years (since 1999), with the remainder to be completed by the end of 2006. An estimated $600 million budget has been allocated to the project. The two-layered fence is about 12 feet tall, complete with watchtowers and floodlights, and parts of it would be electrified in future. About 45,000 members of India’s Border Security Force (BSF) have been deployed to guard the border fence, with another 5,000 to be added in near future. India has justified the security wall or barbed wire fence on what it calls its security concerns. It has been alleging for many years that (a) thousands of illegal immigrants cross over from Bangladesh to India every year causing serious problems for India; (b) most of them are Muslim peasants and workers who alter the demographic balance (Hindu-Muslim ratio), especially in the seven sisters states in the northeast and West Bengal; (c) many of them are so-called ‘Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists who pose serious security problems in the northeast and West Bengal regions; (d) the various indigenous armed groups that are fighting for ˜autonomyâ or independence from the Indian Union have their ˜training camps inside Bangladesh and they carry on sabotage and armed activity within Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura; (e) these rebel groups are supported by the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI with cooperation from the Bangladesh Government; (f) Bangladesh territories are also used by serious criminal gangs who carry on illicit trafficking in arms and explosives, drugs, women and children, etc. According to India, all these problems, in one way or other, are related to their ˜security, and so it is justified to erect the barbed wire fence along the whole border with Bangladesh. Bangladesh has the disadvantage in that it is basically an India-locked country, being surrounded by several Indian states in the west, north, north east and east. The only other country that shares land border with Bangladesh is Myanmar in the southeast. To the south is the Bay of Bengal providing sea access to the outside world. Although the country is relatively small in area (56,000 square miles), its land border with India is quite large (2,500 miles). The border does not have any well defined natural boundaries and is demarcated by concrete posts. According to Mujib-Indira treaty on border demarcation, signed in 1972, there is a gap of 150 yards (450 feet) buffer zone or no man's land, where neither country is allowed to construct any defensive bunkers or installations without consulting and agreement with the other. For most part, the border areas are relatively porous for easy movement of people and cattle, crops, etc. from either side of the border. Bangladesh has protested against the construction of the fence on several occasions but to no effect from the Indian side. Obviously, some of the so-called justifications for the fence are real (which can be sorted out by bilateral discussions and agreements to be honoured by both sides), but most of them are baseless. For example, it is an accepted fact that various criminal gangs and terrorist outfits carry on illegal trade in arms, explosives and drugs to the detriment of both countries. But this trade is not like a one-way traffic. Some arms, ammunitions and explosives that enter Bangladesh through Chittagong areas from Myanmar or other sources may end up in north east India, West Bengal, and even in Nepal. But it is equally true that some arms, explosives and bomb-making material enter Bangladesh from India. Drugs such as heroin and phensidyl enter Bangladesh from India on more or less regular basis. Truckloads of such deadly drugs have been seized by BDR on different occasions in the past. It is hard to believe that the government in Dhaka or Delhi encourages such cross-border illicit trade, but there is a popular perception that are powerful rogue elements within the political, bureaucratic and business establishments in both countries and they are the real masterminds and beneficiaries of such activities. Trafficking of women and children is basically one-way process, from Bangladesh to India and then to Pakistan and some Middle Eastern destinations. Thousands of women end up in the brothels of Kolkata, Mumbai, Delhi, Karachi and many more serve as domestic servants in the so-called middle class homes in India and elsewhere. Some of them are even the victims of traders in human body parts for transplantations of limbs, medical surgeries and research in some affluent private hospitals in India and elsewhere. The children are smuggled into some of the gulf-states to work as camel-jockeys or to be exploited as child sex workers. All these barbarous activities are prohibited in both India and Bangladesh. Both countries have stringent laws to prevent such crimes and punish the perpetrators. Unfortunately, despite attempts by the law enforcing agencies, some criminals escape arrest and carry on with their usual ‘business’. It is to be noted, however, that this particular problem is not unique to India and Bangladesh, but a global issue. The ‘godfathers’ of this trade are not purely Bangladeshi or Indian; they operate together as a part of some kind of international crime syndicate. The border fence may reduce the flow of such illicit trade, but whether it would all be eliminated remains to be seen. The question of massive illegal immigration of Bangladeshi Muslims into India's West Bengal and northeast states to alter the religious demography in the region is fabricated and seems to be arising out of the Muslim-mania of the Brahminist rulers of India. The fact is that the Muslims were in the majority in the undivided Bengal and Assam states prior to the partition of British India in 1947. Since only the Sylhet district of Assam was awarded to East Pakistan in 1947 (Bangladesh since 1971), it is only natural that the rest of Assam province (subsequently reconstituted into six ethnic states) and West Bengal would contain large Muslim populations. But to say that these large numbers of Muslims have emigrated from Bangladesh to these states is a travesty of truth. It is a fact that tens of thousands of Bangladeshis have gone abroad (both legally and illegally) to settle in Britain, USA, Canada, etc, or in search of temporary work in the Middle East and Far East (as the Indians have done over the several decades), but this happened mainly because of improved living conditions and job opportunities or better income in those countries. But why should Bangladeshi Muslims go to live permanently in West Bengal or in the northeast states of India, where the economic conditions are worse off than in Bangladesh? To understand this point, one simply has to visit the rural areas of both sides of the border. Common people in West Bengal, Assam and many other states of India are worse off than the common people in Bangladesh. It is true that many Bangladeshi people (both Hindus and Muslims) go to India for improved medical treatment, education, family visits or simply as tourists, but they return home after their intended stay in India. There may be few people (mostly Hindus) who find work in India and prefer to live there for economic and cultural reasons, but the Bangladeshi Muslims (especially the poor) face serious discrimination and hostility. Even the educated Bangladeshi Muslims would never find any suitable employment in India. In contrast, a large number of Indians work with better salary in Bangladesh and live there with respect and dignity. There is hardly any discrimination against them. According to one estimate, more than one hundred thousand foreigners (mostly Indians) work in Dhaka and Chittagong without any work permit. Thousands of Indians have also managed to procure false documentations and Bangladeshi identities. Bangladesh government does not have the resources to track down all these âillegal workers in the country. Common people are also very tolerant about their presence. The question of ˜Islamist terrorism being exported from Bangladesh to India is of more serious nature but this is equally unfounded and politically motivated. It is true that Bangladesh is facing a security problem from some terrorist outfits, which claim to work for establishing ‘Islamic rule in Bangladesh. But this threat targets Bangladesh, not India, and it is generally appreciated that the people and security agencies of Bangladesh are working very hard to eliminate this threat. Moreover, this phenomenon is of relatively recent origin, whilst the barbed wire fence’ had been conceived in Delhi long before the ‘Islamist terrorism became visible in Bangladesh. So this issue may not be a true reason for the barbed wire fence. India's BWF: Part 2 On more than one occasion, India has accused Bangladesh as a sponsor of anti-Indian insurgencies and conflicts in its northeast states including Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Tripura. It has made the accusations that the rebels from several groups are trained in 195 camps inside Bangladesh and that the Pakistani ISI is running these camps. For those unfamiliar with Indias internal national or ethnic revolts and insurgencies, there are few points to remember. Like the well known insurgency in Kashmir, the civil unrests, ethnic conflicts and insurgencies have been going on in the northeast states of India for nearly 50 years. Many people would remember Dr. Phizo, who was a very prominent rebel leader of the Naga people and worked for the ‘independence’ of Nagaland during 1950s and 1960s. At one stage, he had his headquarters in London. This shows that India’s problems in the northeast are not new; these are, in fact, legacy of the past. The history, geography, ethnicity, religious beliefs, life-style and culture in these areas are different, in many ways, from the mainstream Hindu-dominated Indian society. The mainly tribal communities inhabiting these areas lived outside the folds of the main Indian empires (based in upper Ganges areas; both Hindu and Muslim) for hundreds of years. They were incorporated into the British Indian administration only during the second half of the 19th century. Large scale migration of both Hindu and Muslim peasants and workers from the plains of Bengal occurred during the British period due to the need for harnessing the region's natural resources (oil, timber, tea, hydroelectricity, etc.). The educated outsiders formed the new ruling elite dominant in politics, business and administration. The original inhabitants (mainly mongoloid in racial origin, Buddhist or animist, many converted to Christianity by the missionaries) were marginalized and reduced in relative importance, but they always cherished to live in their own ‘independent homelands’ or at least in some kind of fully autonomous political entities. And failing to achieve their aims by peaceful means, they took up arms against the Indian civil and military authorities. There have been many ups and downs in their peaceful as well as armed struggles against the central Indian government during the last half-century, but the struggles are continuing even today. At an earlier stage, the Christian churches and missionaries supported the struggles of these indigenous peoples, but in recent years there does not seem to be any support left for them. This is probably due to the fact the ‘leaders of the international community find it more desirable to remain friendly with the Delhi administration rather than to show sympathy with these land-locked ethnic minorities in a distant corner of northeast India. Even the so-called defenders of universal human rights seem to be little concerned about the human miseries caused by the counter-insurgency operations in these regions. Not many in the outside world are aware of the fact that the unrest and wars in these regions have resulted in about 50,000 casualties to the Indian security forces, and local insurgents and civilians. The main point to note here is that the anti-Indian movements and insurgencies in northeast regions follow a familiar pattern of resistance against domination, assimilation and integration of relatively smaller and weaker national and ethnic minorities by more powerful ‘central authorities who have tried to solve the problem by strong counter-insurgency methods. Blaming Bangladesh or another country for the unrest and bloodshed in the northeast is not correct.. Although some insurgents may occasionally take shelter within Bangladesh territories (as they do in Nepal, Myanmar or Bhutan), they do so without the knowledge of the government. And it is totally wrong to say that Bangladesh is responsible for the problem. On the question of the Indian rebels’ training camps in Bangladesh, foreign minister Morshed Khan and the BDR authorities have categorically denied the presence of any such camps in Bangladesh. Morshed Khan has also said that if the Indian government would provide details of the insurgent camps in Bangladesh, he would personally take Indian officials for spot inspections. Unfortunately, the Indian side has never taken up this challenge. The other related accusation that Bangladesh allows the Pakistani ISI agents to carry on anti-Indian activities by providing arms and logistics to the Indian rebels is also not based on fact. Pakistan’s involvement in the ‘Kashmir insurgency’ is well known, but there is no solid evidence to suggest that it is using Bangladesh to help the ethnic insurgents in India’s northeast states. In theory, India may do whatever it likes to do within its territories to protect its own national or security interests. But taking any unilateral step that infringes on the legitimate rights of its neighbours is not acceptable. The barbed wire fence conveys the horrific message that Bangladesh is a ‘hostile country’ and that it is alone responsible for the so-called ‘Muslim migration’ to India, cross border arms and drug smuggling, trafficking of women and children, and insurgencies in the north east states. This kind of disinformation campaign is contrary to India' professed friendly’ policies to the eastern neighbour. In constructing the fence, India has not only tried to portray Bangladesh as a ‘pariah state’, it has also violated the provisions of Indira-Mujib treaty (1974) on various issues including border demarcation. On the question of exchange of some ‘enclaves’, Bangladesh has honoured its commitment, but India has not reciprocated. Indian parliament is still to ratify the treaty signed 31 years ago by the prime ministers of the two countries. Obviously, this issue remains unresolved due to the intransigence of the Indian government. Further, according to the Indira-Mujib treaty, no country is allowed to construct any bunker or defence fortifications within 150 yards of ‘no-mansland, but in some places the fence has run within the excluded area. This unilateral action by India has resulted in strong protests by BDR and even in several border clashes and red alerts at different points of the border. India has justified these violations or intrusion into the ‘no man’s land’ on technical grounds, but Bangladesh has argued that the barbed wire fence with bunkers and watchtowers has clear ‘military’ implications and India must not construct the fence within the restricted area. One serious consequence of the fence is the extreme miseries caused to the people living very near to the border on both sides.. It is very unfortunate that when Radcliffe drew the border-line between erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1947, it was done in a hurry. It became an unfortunate reality that people living in one side of the border had their agricultural lands and properties located in the other side. In many cases, members of the same family were split and became citizens of two different countries. Partition came with a vengeance for these families and people. People living in the border areas lived under constant harassment, intimidation and fear due to the aggressive ‘security’ postures of the border security forces of both countries. It is also an unfortunate fact that many members of BSF, due not only to their larger number and more advanced weaponry but also to their relative ignorance of the local language, custom and culture (most BSF members and commanders are non-Bangla speaking), adopt a policy of ‘shoot first and talk later. These policies have resulted in the deaths of a large number of peasants in the border areas. According to a report (New Age, September 11, 2005), 420 Bangladeshi citizens, mostly farmers, had been killed by the BSF and Indian miscreants since January, 2000; 338 of them were killed by the BSF alone; another 1,986 Bangladeshi citizens were victimised by the BSF and Indian miscreants especially in the north and southwest frontiers till August 31, 2005. In most cases, BSF opened fired on working peasants and later dragged their bodies into their territory or killed them after abduction’. 508 people were injured, 487 arrested, 516 abducted, and eight women raped by the BSF and Indian miscreants. While the authorities in Delhi and Dhaka remain busy with power politics, there seem to be little concern at the suspicion and misery among the poor and farming communities in the border areas. Stating the misery that the barbed wire fence would cause to its own citizens, Raekha Prasad comments in a recent report (The Times, December 28, 2005), “the problem India faces is that 100,000 of its citizens live and farm on a 150-yard patch of land hugging the international border known officially as ‘the zero line’, and they live on the wrong side of the fence’s designated path. Entire villages, including schools, temples and mosques lie in what will effectively become no man’s land. Although Bangladeshis and Indians along the border have lived cheek by jowl for decades, and share the Bengali language and culture, relations between them are strained by suspicion. The Indian villagers fear that once the fence is built, they will be harassed by Bangladeshs security guards. They say that locked away from Indian guards their fields and homes could be looted with impunity by Bangladeshi farmers.This kind of suspicion and fear also exist among the villagers on the Bangladesh side of the border. The fact is: sandwiched between the two countries, villagers on both sides of the zero-line will get a raw deal from the border guards. Indias BWF: Part 3 Apart from the residents at the border, several thousand other Bangladeshi citizens who live in the Dahgram and Angorpota ‘enclaves’ inside Indian territories are faced with extreme difficulties. Since the inhabitants of these enclaves are separated from the mainland Bangladesh, they lack civil amenities, electricity and daily necessities. For easy movement of people and goods from Bangladesh to these enclaves and vice-versa, India promised to hand over Tinbigha corridor to Bangladesh in exchange of Berubari union in north Dinajpur district (Indira-Mujib Land Boundary Agreement, May 16, 1974). Bangladesh honoured this Agreement by handing over the Berubari to India more than 30 years ago, but India has not yet kept its part of the bargain. Bangladeshi citizens in the enclaves still depend on (mostly arbitrary) goodwill of India BSF for movement to and from the mainland. This issue is one of many other examples where India has been less than transparent and straightforward in dealing with Bangladesh. Obviously, there is extreme unease within Bangladesh about India’s ultimate intentions along the border, and the ongoing ‘barbed wire fence’ project would only increase the suspicions. It is to be noted, that a 6.5-kilometre stretch of the Indo-Bangla border still remains to be clearly demarcated. Nobody would suggest that the Indian rulers and policy makers are naïve and they would undertake the hugely expensive ‘barbed wire fence’ project without some serious thinking and long-term objective. Since the reasons for the project as stated publicly are not good enough to justify the huge costs and increased enmity with a neighbouring country, what could the real objectives of the project? Frankly speaking, there is no simple or single answer to this question. But one may easily assume that there are several reasons behind India’s barbed wire fence around Bangladesh. To do some justice to the subject, however, one needs in-depth research and analysis covering India’s internal political and socio-cultural dynamics and its perception of and interactions not only with the neighbouring countries, but also with wider world. Since this kind of thorough study is beyond the scope of a newspaper article, I shall try here only to highlight some of the most important factors that guide India’s ruling establishment to adopt various policies and postures in relation to other countries – especially tto Bangladesh. Firstly, one has to understand the nature of Indian state and the political-economic-military-strategic vision of its rulers. It is also important to understand the cultural attitudes of the two largest religious communities inhabiting this part of the planet. India is the second biggest country in Asia in terms of both land area and population. Like China, the biggest, most populous and most powerful country in Asia, India also inherits a very ancient civilisation – extremely rich in political thought, philosophy, artts, literature, astrology and other branches of human knowledge. Ancient Indian civilisations are in no way inferior to ancient Egyptian and Greek civilisations. The religious-cultural life had been enriched and wholly dominated by the teachings of Hinduism or Brahminism and of Buddhismâ for thousands of years, at least until the Muslim conquest in the 11-12th century. Most regions of the sub-continent, except the extreme south and the north east, were ruled by the Muslim Emperors and Sultans for about seven hundred years until the gradual British conquest brought the whole area under its colonial control. When the British rule ended in 1947, a new state Pakistan comprising the Muslim dominated areas in the west (West Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, North West Frontier Province) and in the east (East Bengal and Sylhet district of Assam) was created. The eastern part of Pakistan was subsequently (1971) turned into another new state - Bangladesh. The creation of Pakistan was vehemently opposed by the dominant Hindu Indian leaders, mainly because it was seen as a surrender to religious nationalism and vivisection of mother India. The All India Muslim League, particularly its leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah and founder of Pakistan, is blamed for propagating the religion-based two-nation theory, but the truth is: the two-nation theory was first conceived and publicised by a group of Hindu politicians and intellectuals at the close of the 19th century. They argued that the Muslim religion and culture were foreign’ to Indian soil and being opposed to the Vedic teachings, these could not be accommodated but assimilated within the Indian society. These continued hostilities and constitutional denial to the Muslims of fare share in governance of ‘India after the British’ were the real reasons behind the insistence the Muslim League for the separate state of Pakistan. The cultural divergence between the Hindus and Muslims naturally had its economic and political dimensions. For example, in Bengal the Hindus were far advanced in ‘English education’, different professions and government jobs during the most period of British rule. It was only from 1920s that some Muslims started to receive ‘English education’ and compete for jobs and economic opportunities. This gradual rise of the Muslims particularly their increased political strength in being the majority community in Bengal and Assam was despised by the Hindu elites. The well-known author Nirod C. Chowdhury recorded this situation in one of his writings in 1940s. He wrote, “At one of the meetings of the Corporation (of Calcutta), Khan Bahadur Abdul Momin, one of the most respected leaders of the Bengali Muslims, was shouted down with insults as he was pleading for greater opportunities for the Muslims of Calcutta. He left the Council Chamber to the accompaniment of jeers from some of the younger Hindu councillors. … What I regretted in it (one article) was the generall Bengali Hindu attitudes, not confined to Calcutta only, towards the basic aim of the Muslims of India, which was to maintain their identity as Muslims in a society parallel to that of the Hindus, who were not ready even to consider it as legitimate. … It was, however, this basic demand of the Muslims (foor identity) which the Hindus totally and uncompromisingly rejected. They (the Hindus) declared that it was anti-national.†Obviously, ‘anti-national’, to them, was anti-Hindu. This shows why the Hindu leaders and their successors could never reconcile to the fact that ‘Pakistan’ (for the Muslims) was a separate state outside India’s Hindu cultural fold. Since Bangladesh is a direct consequence of partition of ‘India’ in 1947, it is not unnatural for them also to bear political and cultural hostility towards this Muslim dominated country. To them, Bangladesh is a ‘second Pakistan’ and it must be brought under Hindu Indian cultural control at any cost. Nobody would deny that the rulers of new India were educated in the western style, adopted many western style customs and habits, and believed in western-style democracy and bureaucracy to run the affairs of the state. They incorporated ‘secularism’ (separation of religion from politics) as one of the main pillars of India’s constitution, but did not do anything significant to promote ‘secularism’ in the true sense of the term. On the contrary, many important leaders like Sardar Patel, Morarji Desai, and even Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi and grandson Rajib Gandhi did openly patronise many Hindu Sadhus or holimen and participated in Hindu religious rituals and activities. Indian ruling establishment want us to believe that India is a ‘secular’ country and there is no persecution of the religious or national minorities. But the truth is somewhat different. For example, Indira Gandhi’s assassination was followed by one of the worst Sikh massacres in several cities including Delhi by the extremist Hindu mobs encouraged by the security forces. Anti-Muslim riots are regular phenomenon in India particularly Uttar Pradesh and Maharastra. The Gujrat massacre of Muslims by Hindu fanatics that was instigated and abated by the state government is only one recent example of anti-Muslim politics in India. Torture and killings of the so-called low caste Hindus or untouchables are regular events in states like Bihar. National minorities have been brutally suppressed in Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and other north east states. Anti-Muslim campaigns have been going on for more than half a century in Kashmir valley. And all these atrocities have been going on in the name of unity of ‘mother India’ or to fight ‘terrorism’ by the religious or national minorities in ‘secular’ India! Unfortunately, the outside world or the so-called international community based in the imperialist heartland of Europe and North America criticises Bangladesh for alleged crimes of ‘minority repression’, but remain silent on the hundreds of violent incidents against the religious and national minorities and also against the so-called low caste Hindus. It is true that the first Prime Minister of India Jawharlal Nehru Nehru was a liberal democrat and tried not to play the ‘Hindu-Muslim’ card in politics. It is also true that the founder of modern India, M. K. Gandhi, although a devout Hindu, stood for equal rights for all, irrespective of caste, colour, ethnicity or religious beliefs. But this cannot be said to be true in the case of many other leaders of the ‘secular’ Congress Party. The rightist parties like the Jano Sangh, RSS, Shiva Shena and BJP have always been religion based, advocating for ‘Hindu supremacy’ over the whole south Asia by destroying the ‘Muslim-dominated’ Pakistan and Bangladesh. They consider all Indian Muslims as ‘foreigners and intruders’. Their professed aim is to force the Muslims to adopt Hindu religion and culture and eliminate all Muslim influence from the sub-continent. Most Indian politicians would deny it, but the grim fact remains that the Indian rulers are no less willing and efficient than their counter parts in Pakistan and Bangladesh in using the ‘religious-cultural’ card. Despite a ‘secular’ coating, values inherent in Hindu religion, culture and philosophy remain the inner ingredient of Indian politics and social life, and this ‘religious-cultural’ aspect moulds India’s view, to a significant degree, of the Muslim dominated neighbours including Bangladesh. Problems of India with Pakistan and Bangladesh cannot be fully understood unless one wishes to analyse this element in the sub-continental politics. Indias BWF: Part 4 The other factor to consider India’s policies towards Bangladesh and other neighbours is its perceived role, both present and future, in world politics in general and Asian politics in particular. If one analyses these policies over the last half a century, it becomes evident that India’s economic, diplomatic, and military-strategic policies follow a similar pattern as that followed by other imperialist countries in the past. When India got independence from the British colonial rule, it was primarily an agricultural country beset with extreme poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition and social divisions. But compared with other newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, it was relatively more advanced. It had the advantage in inheriting a rapidly developing local industrial and business class, a British-trained and experienced bureaucracy, educational and research institutions, countrywide railway network, a strong military force, and above all, national leaders like Nehru to put forward a vision for the new Indian state and guide it towards modernisation and development. Despite many difficulties and political uncertainties in some regions, British-style democracy has taken roots in the Indian political culture. Unlike most other post-colonial Asian and African countries, India did not witness any military coups or ‘revolutions’ to challenge or overthrow the civilian rule. This has been a plus point for India, both in domestic governance and international reputation. Western countries have always been appreciative of this democratic culture of India. Since independence, India has made significant strides in education, technology, industry, trade and commerce, international diplomacy and many other fields including information technology. Its relatively cheap, skilled workforce makes it a popular choice for many foreign companies seeking to outsource work. In recent years, particularly since the start of the 1990s, India has opened its previously ‘protected’ domestic market to investors and business houses from other, developed countries. Since India has developed a large urban middle class as consumers (about 300 million, nearly equal to the whole middle class in western Europe), it has become an attractive market for foreign goods and services, and in recent years, for advanced technology and military hardware. India has also the advantage of large geographical expanse.. In area and population, as in natural resources and economy, it is the second biggest country in Asia (China being the first). In the sub-continental scene, it is about four times larger in area and about seven times larger in population than its archrival Pakistan. Compared with Bangladesh, it is about twenty-two times larger in size and about eight times bigger in population. Other neighbouring countries, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, are also much smaller. The tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan, north of Bangladesh, is only nominally independent but effectively an Indian ‘satellite’. The economic, military and diplomatic realities in South Asia are also heavily tilted in India’s favour. The per capita GNI of India ($620, World Bank, 2005) is far less than that of Sri Lanka ($1,010) and only marginally more than that of Pakistan ($600). Per capita GNI of Bangladesh ($440) is about two-thirds of India’s national average, but more that those in many states such as Assam, Tripura and Orissa. Despite rather low per capita GNI, a huge population (1.1 billion, 2005) ranks India as the second largest economy in Asia. The GDP growth per annum at about 8-9% is boosting India’s economy very fast, but even then it would take several decades to achieve a GNI comparable with other ‘developed’ countries. Despite the fact that two-thirds of the population (about 800 million) still live in moderate to extreme poverty, India has been directing a lion’s share of national resources to the acquisition of war materials. Every nation needs some manpower and materials for ‘internal security’ and ‘defence from foreign aggression’, but the vast military arsenal India has acquired over the years cannot be justified on its ‘own security’ reasons alone. India has the long-standing threat perception from China and to some extent from Pakistan. After 1962 border debacle with China, it put war preparations as a top priority. It acquired military hardware from all sources possible, including Russia, Britain, France and the USA. It also embarked on an ambitious project for military research and production of tanks, fighter aircrafts, transport planes, etc. It carried on ‘clandestine’ researches on nuclear weapons and successfully exploded atomic devices in May, 1998. Equipped with nuclear weapons, long distance missiles and other modern armaments, India now feels uninhibited to discard its long professed policies of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. In the sub-continent, Pakistan is the only country that has some sort of military clout to obstruct, if not prevent, the onward mach of India’s war chariot. Pakistan also possesses a huge military force and nuclear weapons, but its overall strength is far inferior to India’s power. This is revealed in the following figures (BBC website) on military balance between the two countries (India/Pakistan) for the year 2002: armed forces manpower: 1,325,000/620,000; combat aircraft: 744/744, nuclear missiles 60/25; surface warships: 29/8; submarines 19/10; military expenditure: US$ 13.8 billion/2.7 billion. India enjoys a considerable edge not only in numerical strength but also in quality, performance and technological sophistication. In the early 1960s, India took the advantage of its border war with China to increase its military budget and acquire different weapons not only from its main ‘strategic partner’ Russia, but also from the USA, Britain and France. Similarly, it took full advantage of the so-called ‘war on terror’ launched by George Bush, Jr., in 2001, and very quickly joined in the US-led campaign. India launched a diplomatic offensive to isolate its rival Pakistan from the US and other western countries on the one hand, and to bargain for a new deal for itself, on the other. After several rounds of negotiations, the US accepted India as a ‘power’ in the sub-continent and in the Indian Ocean areas. The USA lifted the sanctions it had previously (after these countries went nuclear in 1998) imposed on exports of certain types of technology and military hardware to both India and Pakistan. This opened the way for a new type of strategic cooperation between India and USA. For the last few years India has been carrying on with extensive military preparations and staging mock wars. The defence budget has seen an annual increase of 10%. Two aircraft carriers along with new radar and weapons systems have been added to the Navy. India is one of the world’s biggest arms importers. It is negotiating to buy new six submarines from France and advanced rocket launcher systems from Russia. In February 2004, India’s then Defence Minister George Fernandes listed an effective air defence system as his highest priority and said, “New Delhi is seeking permission from ally Russia to deal directly with manufacturers to speed up sale of spare partsâ€. Russia accounts for 70 percent of Indian arms import. Fernandes also said that New Delhi would replace its ageing attack missiles mostly through imports. "Some of the top-priority acquisitions will be the medium multi-role combat aircraft, air defence systems, (nuclear) command and control, communications ... advanced weapons for aircraft, advanced warning and control systems and force-multipliers," he said. According to a report in the Daily Star (February 6, 2004), French electronics firm Thales unveiled last year details of plans to transfer critical technology to India for the construction of 19 low-level air defence radar systems within the next three years. The report also said that the US armaments industry had offered to sell high-technology Patriot anti-missiles system to India on the back of an earlier promise by President Bush to forge closer links with India over nuclear regulation, safety and missile defence. The US government also lifted restrictions from US defence companies to bid for a large Indian order for combat aircraft. India had its greatest diplomatic success in the summer last year when it concluded an agreement with the USA for cooperation in ‘civilian nuclear technology’. Under the terms, the US will supply nuclear reactors, so long denied, to India for ‘peaceful purposes’ only, not for military use, and the facilities would remain open for international/US inspection. It was also agreed to cooperate on intelligence gathering and joint actions for ‘security’ and fighting ‘international terrorism’. Apart from foreign purchases, India is desperately trying to increase its own capabilities for production of high-tech weapons. According to an AFP report, (New Age, December 29, 2005), India had very recently successfully tested its short-range Dhanush ballistic missile, a naval version of the surface-to-surface Prithvi, from a ship in the Bay of Bengal off the eastern coast. The missile has a striking range of 250 kilometres and a capacity to carry a load of 500 kilograms. The report also said that India “has already developed and deployed two ballistic missiles and a surface missile. It hopes to cap the programme with a 5,000-kilometre range ballistic missile to give it the capability of striking beyond South Asia.†Uday Bhaskar, head of the government-funded Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, justified the increase in military expenditure as a part of modernisation programme of India’s armed forces. The new deal between India and USA on the nuclear issue is considered as a fundamental change in Washington’s policy towards New Delhi and hailed by both parties as a landmark in India-US relations. Washington has now opened the Indian arms and technology market for its products (an excellent business opportunity for the US military-industrial complex); for India, Washington has finally acknowledged its new ‘role’ in the world. It is widely believed that the USA has finally decided to accept India as a strategic partner not only as a deterrent against China’s rising power but also to fight against the so-called international terrorism in the region from Iran/Afghanistan to Indonesia. And with this new development, the already existing US-Israel alliance has been effectively turned into a tripartite US-Israel-India strategic alliance. How long this alliance will last or what would be its impact in the long run remains to be seen, but the Muslim dominated countries from Indonesia to Syria have every reason to be alarmed at the new development. In conclusion, India’s imperialist ambitions, supported by the US and Israel, have increased manifold to cause further troubles in the region. Its unprecedented military preparations, aggressive diplomacy and socio-economic dynamics all point to the emergence of a new imperialist power in Asia. And, if history is any guide, there is every possibility that the politically divided and militarily weak smaller countries including Bangladesh would become the first target of this new imperialist adventure. The implications of the ‘barbed wire fence’ around Bangladesh should be viewed in this context.. ------------------------------- [Dr. K. M. A. Malik is a former Professor of Chemistry, Dhaka University, and a Lecturer in Chemistry, Cardiff University (UK). He has published about 370 research papers in chemistry journals. As a freelance columnist, he also writes regularly on contemporary political and social issues. His published books include: Challenges in Bangladesh Politics – a Londoner’s view (2005); War on Terrror – A pretext for new colonisation (2005), and Bangladesher Rajniti - Mookh O Mookhosh (2003). His e-mail contact: kmamalik@aol.com] http://newsfrombangladesh.net/view.php?hidRecord=250500 |
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