| The Challenge of Bangladesh's Combustible Security Force The Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) mutiny that started on the morning of February 25th – less than 2 months after Sheikh Hasina assumed the office of Prime Minister – has a myriad of implications for Bangladesh. Not only is it a security threat to the state, but it reflects the troubled civil-military relations that have plagued the nation since its independence. The demands of the mutineers were relatively simple and primarily involved a rectification of their subordinate position vis-a-vis the military. As it stands, the 67,000-man force is tasked with defending Bangladesh's borders and is classified as a paramilitary organisation. As a result – and in contrast to the army – it is not permitted to be deployed under the UN banner for peacekeeping operations, for which soldiers receive a substantial pecuniary benefit. Furthermore, the BDR is led by army officers seconded to it, who have commensurately little institutional loyalty. Consequently, the ranks of the BDR complain that these officers ignore their grievances and exclude them from special privileges. The BDR claim that the mutiny was a result of these pent-up frustrations. The immediate result of the mutiny was an estimated death toll of 74, overwhelmingly comprised of officers, but including the wife of the commander of the BDR. Many of the bodies were found in collective graves, mutilated, indicating far more than a surgical decapitation of the officers against whom grievances had arisen. Furthermore, the vast scale of the mutiny means that it cannot be seen as a haphazard attack against a single set of callous officers, but a coordinated rebellion. That the mutiny occurred with seemingly no warning is a sign of a catastrophic intelligence failure in the Bangladeshi security services The BDR has a rich history and tradition, even compared to centuries-old European units. It is held in very high esteem in South Asia as a professional force dating back to 1795 when the British East India Company formed the Ramgarh Local Battalion, and as the East Pakistan Rifles it fought with great gallantry in 1971 during the war of independence against Pakistan, for which it has earned the nation's heart, and the nickname The Vigilant Sentinels of Our National Frontier. The BDR's continued status as a paramilitary force has two advantages for the state. As it is controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs it represents a significant military asset not controlled by the army – already rumors are rife that the mutiny was engineered by Sheikh Hasina to rid the BDR of its army officers, and so create a private army for her. As a separate issue, the BDR's role in guarding Bangladesh's border with India is a highly contentious issue as there are frequent skirmishes between the BDR and India's Border Security Force (BSF). Stories of the BSF's incursions into Bangladesh are ubiquitous in the local press, causing outrage and helping provoke the skirmishes between the two forces. These are sources of serious problems between the two nations, but the BDR's and BSF's statuses as a paramilitary forces provide insulation against involving their respective militaries proper – potentially leading to full-scale war. After subduing the mutineers by calling in the army, Sheikh Hasina has requested the combined expertise of the FBI and Britain's Scotland Yard as there has emerged a seemingly widespread opinion that the revolt was not merely over pay, but a part of a larger attack aimed at toppling government. The government's use of outside help in this matter has two important consequences. Hopefully, it means that the findings of the investigation will not be swept under the carpet to be used at a later date against political opponents, but will become public knowledge. This could increase the current government's international standing.. However, it also signals that the government does not believe itself to be strong enough to deal with the threat by itself, and the military will be watching anxiously. The military has a history of taking control when civilian incompetence begins to severely threaten the state, not always with the disapproval of the populace. Indeed, the January 2007 army-backed takeover from the previous civilian government was met with widespread gratitude by citizens tired of feuding politicians. Under the latter's aegis corruption had risen to crippling levels, with Transparency International labeling Bangladesh the globe's most corrupt country for five years. The caretaker government declared the rooting out of corruption to be their foremost aim, and the anticorruption campaign's perceived (though questionable) success meant that following the coup the top echelons of the military had an excuse to drag their heels on relinquishing even indirect control in favor of a civilian government. Essentially, a military that sees civilian governments as breeding corruption to such an extent as to endanger the state is a military over which it is difficult to assert civilian control. Sheikh Hasina is certainly an embodiment of this fear. She had a very turbulent relationship with the previous military-backed caretaker government. During its reign Hasina was accused of extortion, leading to her being barred from entering the country in mid-2007 and subsequently arrested in July. Similar charges were leveled at her principal political opponent, Khaleda Zia. The fact that the entire episode represented the military's efforts to rid Bangladesh of the two personalities that have fought over the nation for decades, rather than any action targeting solely Sheikh Hasina, does little to mitigate the poor relations between Hasina and the military. The current crisis, coming so soon after the return of a truly independent civilian government will be incredibly frustrating for the military establishment, whose fears have been confirmed once again. Besides the momentary collapse of Bangladesh's borders, allowing free rein for smugglers, many of the BDR fled once the army were deployed against them, removing heaps of weapons and military grade explosives. They were followed by local criminal groups who likewise looted the various BDR compounds, and it is feared that these weapons will be sold on the black market to Bangladesh's Islamist groups. Sheikh Hasina's government needs to move quickly to fulfill its duties and gain the public's confidence, or there is a strong possibility that the military will retake control. That would be catastrophic for attempts at the consolidation of civilian supremacy in Bangladesh, and next time around the army not give up power so easily again. Given Bangladesh's staggering array of social, economic, and political challenges, this fluidity regarding the most basic facets of governance bodes poorly for policy coherence going forward. http://blog.freedomhouse.org/weblog/2009/03/the-challenge-of-bangladeshs-combustible-security-forces-.html |
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